The procedural demands of the new European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) require the 'Citizens Committees' which host them to be backed by professional organisation. One potential source would be civil society organisations (CSOs) organised at EU level. Yet direct participatory democracy measures challenge the status of established Brussels based NGOs seeking an alternative 'Civil Dialogue' between themselves and EU political institutions. The institutionalised advocacy orientation of these EU NGOs make them ill-suited to developing mass campaigning activities, although the ECI concept will incentivise such groups to develop more direct links with those they seek to advocate for. By contrast, there is a new community of CSOs newly mobilised into EU politics by the ECI, largely from Germany and Austria, with a more political orientation than traditional EU CSOs. These organisations are progressively becoming EU institutionalised, opening Brussels outreaches and increasingly appearing on the (European) Transparency Register. Either way, the ability of groups to link the EU institutions with civil society will be enhanced by the ECI.
European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) is clearly distinguishable from the mainstream constituency of Brussels based interest groups geared towards institutionalised dialogue between themselves and EU institutions. Stressing this distinction, European Parliament Vice-President Diana Wallis, the EP's member most involved with institutional measures for participatory democracy affecting both direct and organised civil society strands, commented forthrightly: 'an ECI is not for MEPs, not for NGOs, but for all citizens ' (EurActiv, 2011) . Nonetheless, the procedural demands of the ECI require the 'Citizens Committees' which host them to have access to professional organisation. One potential source might thus be civil society organisations (CSOs) established at EU level. because it is actively campaigning on associated data protection rights issues involved with the ECI. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has also tried out the concept pre-Regulation, seeking to use its geographic breadth of organisation 4 as well as its recent experiences in organising public protest events. Of note, however, is that it failed to achieve 60% of the required threshold level of one million signatures; a view is that the issue was too broadly and generally focused upon a 'Europe for high quality services, accessible to all'.
Solidar, aligned with the wider socialist and labour movement, also launched a pre-Regulation initiative to 'Save our Social Europe' which failed to reach the threshold of signatures, attributed also to a failure to give sufficient prominence to the campaign among the organisation's other issues (Fischer and Lichtblau, 2008 Social Platform, 2010) . In essence, the seven demands in the document ask for a special status in EU policy-making, and enhanced funding, for organisations which carry eligibility criteria which match those of the Platform itself. The document seeks to re-interpret the other instruments of Article 11 as placing new requirements upon the institutions to establish a 'Civil Dialogue', the issue which the Social Platform was formed to pursue; thus, a classic exercise aimed at agenda re-framing.
In an accompanying letter to its response, the Platform wrote:
'As a response, Social Platform calls on the European Commission to launch a public consultation on how to implement the first part of the Lisbon The European Civic Forum (ECF) took a similar position to the Platform:
'in addition to direct participation tools such as the European Citizens' initiative or the European Citizens Consultation, and the relatively permanent and structured dialogue that some European institutions developed over the years with civil society organisations, there is now a need to devise a structured, efficient and sustainable overall framework for European civil dialogue' (ECF, 2010).
In some accounts, the ambivalence towards the ECI among some of the established NGOs could also be reflected within the wider European Commission because of the way it represents a perceived challenge to its right of initiative.
This remains a matter of speculation; just as interesting is the potential ambivalence within the Secretariat General itself as a result of the 'organised civil society pathway' it has thus far followed rather than direct democracy measures. Whilst there is a broad tradition of pursuing a participatory democracy strand within this particular service, it has to date been more driven by a practical orientation to work within the existing framework of relations for a climate of continual improvement. The 'existing framework' is based around creating a pluralist system of checks and balances with organised civil society, refining administrative procedures aimed at achieving a democratic basis of transparency, a balance of input, equality of access, and deliberation (Dahl, 1982) . The European Citizens' Initiative represents something quite different.
Whilst some of the organisations mobilised by the ECI question the extent to which the Secretariat General has reached beyond its Brussels dialogue partners to inform wider civil society, the 'Warming up for the Citizens' Initiative'
conference it hosted in January 2012 struck a different note entirely, with
Commission speakers at a variety of levels heralding a 'new dawn' in the democratic life of the EU, and even towards a 'common European civic space'. 
The demands made on Petition host organisations by ECI procedures

Working through the European Commission's 2012 Guide to the European
Citizens' Initiative 7 helps to identify the resource requirements for a would-be Initiative:
• the identification of the legal basis of Treaty competencies under which the proposed measure falls, and ensuring that it is not contrary to EU values as stated in the Treaties (such as subsidiarity and the Charter of Fundamental Rights -Ponzano, 2011). These factors will require legal advice of varying depth depending upon the degree of certainty involved.
• recruiting at least seven citizens of voting age who are nationals of at least seven member states;
• attracting sufficient funding, and sources willing for their sponsorship to be declared publicly;
• translation costs for twenty three official languages of the EU;
• building an online collection system which meets very detailed technical requirements, themselves the subject of an implementing Regulation, 8 and certified by the national authority where the data is to be stored;
• collecting one million signatures within twelve months of registering the Initiative on the official Commission web site for the scheme 9 , requiring signatories to provide various data about themselves depending upon the member state. This includes, in two-thirds of member states, the need to supply a national identification document number alongside the full postal address, and date and place of birth; and a signature for nonelectronic collection means;
• bearing legal responsibility for complying with data protection requirements;
• obtaining certification in each of at least seven member states of reaching the threshold of the minimum number of signatures. A question arises as to whether the resources which EU interest organisations have are by themselves sufficient to meet the above requirements. Among EU business associations, only one association has more than fifty staff, because they are narrowly specialised upon interest representation to EU institutions rather than the provision of services to individual (SME) member companies. (of which one sixth were collected online 11 ) in its petition "1 million 4 disability".
Whilst these were collected without the full burden of the verification procedures set out in the 2011 Regulation, signatories were required to provide personal details (including an address and date of birth, but short of a national ID number). A bailiff was hired by EDF to check these, and as an additional measure compliance with data protection was assured by registering the initiative at the 'Commission for the protection of private life'. To achieve such a high level of signatories, the EDF sought to use its membership network to reach down to local levels, explicitly aimed at creating the impression of a 'bottom-up'
Citizens' Initiative rather than a 'Top-Down' measure (Green European Foundation, 2010), despite its own leadership role and primary function in addressing EU institutions; in other words, it sought to reinvent itself through mirror image. Each of its (29) national association members were given specific quotas to fulfil, as well as tasks such as translation. Beyond this, a wider support network was also used, such as the Airports Council InternationalEurope (400 airports in 45 countries), a long-time dialogue partner with EDF, which agreed to disseminate the petition widely in the premises of its members.
The Belgian national broadcasting organisation pledged to obtain 50,000
signatures. EDF itself undertook a full public relations campaign, recruiting celebrities, holding a variety of public events, and using the media to the full.
The one million threshold was reached within nine months.
The EDF case suggests that EU federations can pool together the necessary resources to achieve the threshold for the right issue, using the advantage they have of members in the member states. Three of the seven EU level organisations which tried out the ECI concept pre-Regulation were federations.
Whilst ETUC has the broadest membership base, it was unable to achieve 60% of the required signature threshold (in pre-Regulation form). However, this is attributed among the 'ECI community' to the generalised nature of the issue it proposed, rather than to network resource deficiencies. The ETUC affiliated European Federation of Public Services Unions is among the first to be preparing an official initiative ('Water is a human right, not a commodity'), again based on the advantage of access to network resources to which the European trade union movement has.
The EDF-ETUC comparison also suggests that organisations need to network beyond their own membership to draw in those who are able to provide other resources. There is, apparently, no shortage of legally qualified personnel willing to offer their services for such a high profile and new initiative. Beyond this are required data protection specialists, professional fund-raisers, and marketing professionals. EDF were able to assemble all of these resources and skill sets in support of their campaign, but needed to draw from beyond its member resources to do so, from organisations willing to support a cause with which they wished to be associated.
Another successful proposer of a pilot initiative, Aktion Eliant, involves a case of an organisation with a more limited resource base than EDF. It resolved this problem through its position within a wider established international movement of producers and consumers of anthrosophic (spiritual) medicine, including
Steiner institutions, centred in Switzerland. However, the organisation has become socialised in the Brussels network by its experience with its initiative, recently opening an outlet in Brussels and regularly networking with other organisations recently mobilised by the ECI.
Thus, it is access to network resources, rather than ownership of resources itself, which is a key issue, in conjunction with the nature of the issue itself. The failure of the Solidar Initiative has also been attributed, in part, to variable commitment from network partners (Fischer and Lichtblau, 2008) . One of the best funded of the unofficial pre-Regulation initiatives, the European Emergency Number, hosted by the corresponding association, failed to achieve more than 15,000 signatories in four years (Green European Foundation, 2010) . And the Friends of the Earth unofficial ECI '1 Million against Nuclear Power', despite recruiting 780 supporting organisations, was unable to attract more than 634, failure is attributed to the loose nature of the network of supporting organisations together with the lack of central co-ordinating mechanisms (illustrated by the inclusion of signatures from Swiss citizens in the total), varying degrees of commitment, a topic which was at that time considered to have been exhausted relative to fresher concerns such as climate change, the inclusion of too many demands, and considerable variation between member states in opposition to nuclear power (Fischer and Lichtblau, 2008) .
Conclusion: the Impact of the ECI on Civil Society Organisations and the future of EU participatory democracy
The European Citizens' Initiative is seen by its movers as primarily an agendasetting tool (Kaufman, 2012) , particularly given its lack of mandatory status. It is therefore impossible for advocacy related organisations to ignore. Whilst civil society organisations at EU level find the ECI a threat to a 'Civil Dialogue' agenda which is centred on them, the risk of ignoring the ECI is the prospect of marginalisation from the constituency they claim to speak for if an initiative is launched within their fields of domain. To date, the institutionalised nature of EU politics means that such groups have been heavily incentivised to prioritise their activities towards advocacy with EU institutions rather than 'bringing the EU to their members' (Warleigh, 2001; Sudbery, 2003) . Bouza Garcia summarises the significance of the consequence:
'competition with outsider organisations using the ECI may give EU civil society organisations a strong motivation to inform, involve and mobilise their members and public opinion at large which would in turn contribute to a generalisation of public sphere oriented participation tools. The consequence may be that the Commission -civil society relations would turn from a low saliency, expertise oriented and consensus seeking regime towards a more public opinion and mobilisation and contested regime'.
(Bouza Garcia, 2011, p.15) Among Thus, the new community of organisations at EU level mobilised by the ECI also have little choice but to join in the game of EU institutionalised politics. In order to pursue the detail of the issues on which they advocate, they need access to the specialised consultation opportunities which EU institutions provide. As a general rule, political institutions almost always prefer to have a dialogue with stakeholders rather than have them 'shout abuse through the letter box'
(Bettsworth, cited in Jordan and Halpin, 2003, p.319) ; this norm particularly applies to the EU context where the relationship with interest organisations is highly institutionalised.
The end result thus seems to be that existing institutionalised EU groups will become incentivised to become much more outward looking towards both their own members and to civil society more generally, to the benefit of the EU 'public space'; while the ECI will bring in a new constituency of civil society organisations and social movements not previously engaged with EU institutions.
The democratic legitimacy of the EU can only benefit. 
